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  Arthur C. Danto
Abstract
In this "Reply to my Critics," I explain that The Transfiguration
of the Commonplace was essentially a contribution to the
ontology of art in which two necessary conditions emerge as
essential to a real definition of the art work: that an artwork
must (a) have meaning and (b) must embody its meaning.
Many issues have emerged in the course of art's history that
are very much part of its practice but are not part of art's
essence. In response to Cynthia Freeland, I argue that though
the book does not address art criticism, the two necessary
conditions specify a viable rule for critical practice, as was
recognized by Hegel. And in response to Ivan Gaskell, I argue
that the definition of art arrived at in the book is capable of
drawing a distinction between art works and artifacts.
Key Words
art criticism, artifact, definition of art, enfranchisement,
ontology
I am grateful to each of the panelists for their rich and
searching papers, but I owe a special debt to Tom Wartenberg
for having noticed that 2006 is a significant anniversary of The
Transfiguration of the Commonplace; for having organized this
silver anniversary celebration; and for having written the kind
of wise critique that puts into perspective what kind of
marriage between philosophy and art the book exemplifies.
Marriage was much on my mind in writing the book, as
readers of the preface know, as it was finished in the months
after the death of my first wife and published in the early
months of my second marriage. The book is certainly as much
about philosophy as it is about art, in fact, as Wartenberg
knows, even more about philosophy than about art, and I
would like to begin by responding to his astute query about
their relationship by situating the book in its true philosophical
setting.

* * *
Though published in 1981, the issues addressed by The
Transfiguration presented themselves to me in my 1964 paper,
"The Art World," when I was thinking about perhaps five
different subjects all at once, and all in the same way: the
philosophy of history, the philosophy of knowledge, the
philosophy of action, and the philosophy of mind, as well as
the philosophy of art. I was terribly lucky that the art world
took the turn it took in 1964 or I would not have been able to
write on art at all. It was to the history of the art world rather
than of the aesthetics world of the time that the book really
belongs, which is part of the reason I thought of what was
happening in the art world as closer to the kind of philosophy I
was doing than to anything then happening in aesthetics.
When Paul Benaceraff invited me to give a paper on aesthetics
for the APA's Eastern Division meeting that year, Paul Ziff
having withdrawn, I was able to do so only because the art
that excited me raised questions of the kind that interested me
in a general kind of way. I had no special interest in

aesthetics, and that showed in the paper I presented, and
continued to show in the Transfiguration, fifteen years later. I
was interested in ontology, in the question of what makes
something a work of art. The great thing about the Sixties was
the dawning recognition that anything could be a work of art,
which was something evident in all the main movements of the
time—in Pop, Minimalism, Fluxus, and Conceptual art.
I have increasingly come to recognize that my concern was
with enfranchisement, that is, what makes a human being a
citizen, which was like: What makes an object an art work?
Or, what makes a bodily movement an action? Or, what makes
what is present to the mind a piece of knowledge? — and so
on, for each of the subjects I was struggling to understand.
The big mantra in the art world was Frank Stella's sullen
"What you see is what you see." There was not a lot of
difference between seeing Brillo Box by Warhol and the Brillo
boxes designed by James Harvey for the Brillo people to move
their products about in. So: why weren't they art works if
Andy's factory-produced boxes were?
I knew that art works had rights and privileges grocery boxes
lacked, the way citizens had rights and privileges mere
persons lacked — which compares with the responsibilities that
go with a raised arm when it is an action, but not with a risen
arm when it is merely a bodily movement. We have to
remember that 1964 was the summer of freedom, in which a
number of exceedingly brave whites were no longer disposed
to accept "because they are black" as a reason why blacks
were disenfranchised, and decided to help a number of
exceedingly brave blacks in the South help other blacks claim
their civil rights. It later occurred to me that breaking down
boundaries began with art works and went on to cover, in the
later Sixties, race, gender, and whatever else seemed
disempowering. I hardly could have seen that in 1964; it only
became visible in 1968 and 1969, if even then. But at least I
was not happy with an institutional answer to the question of
what made something art any more than I would have been
interested in institutional answers to the question of when
something is knowledge or action or history. There were real
problems with the institutions of enfranchisement if so many
persons entitled to enfranchisement were being denied it.
I deeply believed that all philosophical questions had to be
answered at the same time and in the same kind of way. My
procedural model at the time was Wittgenstein's dazzling
question: What remains over when you subtract from the fact
that you raised your arm the fact that your arm went up?
What remains over when you subtract from the fact that
something is a work of art the fact that it is an object? Stella
thought nothing remained over, just as Wittgenstein, or at
least the Wittgensteinians, thought nothing remained over,
that "What happened and what you do are the same thing," as
Miss Anscombe said in her book Intention. I was of the
opposite view. If a work of art is an object plus x, the problem
was to solve for x, just as, if a basic action is a bodily
movement plus y, the task was to solve for y.
That led to a search for the necessary conditions for acthood,
or arthood, or whatever. The right place to start was with
knowledge, since we had behind us two millennia of hard

thought that, beginning with the Theaetetus, led to three and,
in our time, four necessary conditions. I published Analytical
Philosophy of Knowledge in 1968, the Analytical Philosophy of
Action — which was almost the same book — in 1973, and
only then, in the early '80s, what would have been the
Analytical Philosophy of Art in 1981, had I not been fed up
with the reading lists for courses called that, and stole the title
The Transfiguration of the Commonplace from Muriel Spark's
great novel, The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie.
That book, by the way a religious novel, taught me that the
philosophy of religion has all the same questions that
concerned me, and that I could have produced a philosophy of
religion, using all the same moves. In Spark's book, The
Transfiguration of the Commonplace was written by her
character, Sister Helena of the Transfiguration. I think I know
what Sister Helena's book had to have been about. The Brillo
Box- Brillo box problem is exactly like the problem of
differentiating Jesus Christ from an imagined commonplace
look-alike who happens merely to be human, unlike Jesus,
who is also a God. Suppose we subtract from the fact that
Jesus Christ is God incarnate everything that belongs to his
incarnation — blood, foreskin, hair, c-fibers so that he can feel
pain, etc. — then what is left over? The Feast of the
Circumcision celebrates Jesus' humanity, since his first blood
was shed when his foreskin was cut. But what would have
established his godhood, empirically speaking? However that
question is to be answered, no really religious person can be
an Institutionalist.
When we see that ontology is the pursuit of necessary
conditions, a lot of the theory and practice of art drops away. I
realized that with a shock in a recent correspondence with a
former student, Aili Bresnahan, who picked up what she
thought was a flung gauntlet: that if someone can show me
something that any given form of art has that my definition,
as far as it went, lacked, then my philosophy of art (and of
everything) is defeated. Aili was a dancer, and she found in
Balanchine's view of dance many things that have no
counterpart in literature or painting. She was perfectly right,
but I was only thinking that if dance is art, it need only meet
the necessary conditions art works meet. I was thinking about
dancing that did — Yvonne Rainier, for example, or Steve
Paxton, and the Judson Dancer in general — who grasped the
Sixties question of distinguishing merely sitting in a chair and
a dance movement consisting of sitting in a chair. Noel Carroll
wrote a brilliant essay on the end of dance that paralleled
exactly my argument for the end of art, which meant that he
would have the same problems in dealing with his thesis as he
found I had with mine.
Strictly speaking, the end of art could be matched by the end
of knowledge, the end of action, the end of history, and the
end of religion, which gave Francis Fukayama so much trouble
when his book on the end of history appeared. I mean that all
these reveal their philosophical structure at once. As we know,
people go on believing after that, just as they go on making
art when art's philosophical nature is disclosed more by art —
as in the Sixties — than by philosophy proper, which was
somewhere else at the time, barking up different trees. Not
wrong trees, but different trees. I was doing ontology, as I

say, but with a twist. Not dealing neatly with the question
"What is an art work?" but with "Given two perceptually
indiscernible objects, one an art work, the other not, what
accounts for the difference?" That question was the gift to
philosophy of the art of the Sixties. Not just to the philosophy
of art, but to the philosophy of x, where the value of x is
pretty much the curriculum of philosophical education,
construed ontologically. Apart from the change of question,
there is a change of answer to the question. The differences
cannot be perceptual, cannot be something that is discerned,
to use the title of Caroline Jones' recent study of Clement
Greenberg, By Eyesight Alone. The differences are all invisible.
That by itself explains why ontology isn't science, and why,
easy as it was to prove Christ's humanity, his divinity had to
remain a matter of faith.
A lot of people were interested in the art of the Sixties, for a
lot of different reasons. But I was the only one interested who
was also interested in the ontological dimension of the
philosophy of history, knowledge of action, mind, and religion
at the same time; and where anything not bearing on this was
of interest to be sure, but not of great interest to me when I
wrote "The Art World" and later The Transfiguration of the
Commonplace. Once we see the book as bringing to the
surface what amounts to two necessary conditions — meaning
and embodiment — that led to the doubtless premature
definition that something is an artwork only if it embodies its
meaning, it is easy to see how much of the concept of art as it
grew by accrual over the millennia is in the end not part of the
definition, since something lacking it can still be an art work
according to the two criteria I felt resisted counterexemplification. One of these is raised by Cynthia Freeland
asking whatever happened to art criticism? There is a lot of
what I consider art criticism in the book, but not a lot of
discussion of it as criticism.
Not the book so much as I myself, as art critic, have been
deemed responsible for what has been called "A Quiet Crisis,"
by Raphael Rubinstein, an editor of the periodical Art in
America. It consists in the fact that critics have gotten out of
the business of making value judgments. Rubenstein cites a
pioneer survey, sponsored by the now-extinct National Arts
Journalism Program at Columbia University, that discovered
that nearly 75% of the critics surveyed believe that "rendering
a personal judgment is . . . the least important factor in
reviewing art," while 91% feel it their main role to "educate
the public about visual art and why it matters." While I am not
exactly blamed for this being "a period of interpretation rather
than judgment," it explains "why the philosophically inclined
Arthur Danto has been the most widely read and cited critic of
the last decade or so." I really do side with the 91% of critics
that feels my "main role" is to "educate the public about visual
art and why it matters." Since what makes the difference
between art and reality is (a) meaning and (b) embodiment,
none of which meets the eye, the "good eye of the critic"
means not a lot to me.
Hence Clement Greenberg and Hilton Kramer — or Emily
Genauer, late critic of the late Herald Tribune — mean not a
lot to me since mostly they were deeply wrong about the art
that led me into my philosophy. Freeland cites what I found

wrong in Kramer's assessment of Eva Hesse, that he did not
really know what he was looking at, though I recently found
that he was truly generous to Louise Nevelson, whom
Greenberg ridiculed. Greenberg dismissed Duchamp as
"novelty art," falling back on the old injunction epater le
bourgeois. Emily Genauer did not let an opportunity pass to
take a dig at the great abstractionist Ellsworth Kelly. My
feeling is that critics have to learn to describe what they are
looking at, meaning learning to determine which parts of the
object embody which parts of the meaning, after which there
is not a lot to say by way of pronouncing value judgments. I
am not a slavish Hegelian, but I found that Hegel, who was a
marvelous art critic, held similar views. When he declares the
end of art, for example, he writes:
What is now aroused in us by works is not just
immediate enjoyment but our judgment also,
since we subject to our intellectual consideration
(i) the content of art and (ii)the work of art's
means of presentation, and the appropriateness
or inappropriateness of both to one another. The
philosophy of art is therefore a greater need in
our days than it was when art itself by itself
yielded full satisfaction. Art invites us to
intellectual consideration, and that not for the
purpose of creating art again, but for knowing
philosophically what art is. [p.11]
Some eighty pages on he takes this up and amplifies it
slightly:
If we recall what we have already established
about the concept of the beautiful and art, we
find two things: first a content, an aim, a
meaning; and secondly the expression,
appearance, and realization of this content. But
thirdly, both aspects are so penetrated by one
another that the external, the particular, appears
exclusively as the presentation of the inner.
[p.95]
So what more must we do by way of criticism than get all this
right when we write our critical essays about individual works
of art? Liking or not liking — not that this is what necessarily
counts for Freeland as criticism — does not count, or count for
much. I was delighted when it occurred to me that Hegel's two
conditions were easily mapped onto my two, but that in my
case they (1) together constituted a definition of an art work,
and (2) together marked the two moments of a piece of art
criticism, as I construed it. When we have the content
(meaning) and the mode in which it is presented, what more
by way of criticism do we need? Greenberg was interested in
what he called quality. He felt that only someone who had
spent a lot of time looking at abstract painting was qualified to
pronounce on its possession of quality, and that critics like
John Canaday at the New York Times and Emily Genauer at the
New York Herald Tribune — monsters both — had not earned
the right to say whether something had or lacked it. It was
like getting to know quality in wine, hence the appropriateness
of taste. It would have been pointless, for example, for me to
have opened un bon bouteille for my father, who invariably

dismissed it as horse piss. There is, on the other hand,
something silly about wine criticism, as readers of it know, in
part because it consists in an inventory of tastes the purchaser
is supposed to look for, without any sense of why these tastes
make it good or their absence make it bad. But this is
because, with wine, it is difficult to think that meaning has a
lot to do with its being good or bad.
But meaning is, as we say, where it is at with art, and where
we must face the truth that two indiscernible objects must
might have deeply different meanings, so that the critic's good
eye is, as it were, bandaged over. We need look no further
that the two Brillo Boxes. It is easy to write the art criticism of
James Harvey's box, understood rhetorically, as celebrating
the goodness of Brillo. Warhol's Brillo Box instead celebrates
the Brillo box, and really the art criticism of Warhol's piece is
the same no matter which of the six or eight grocery boxes he
happened to have in the 1964 show at the Stable Gallery.
What makes Brillo Box memorable must be credited to Harvey
but not to Warhol, who did not design it. What the art criticism
of his grocery boxes would look like is difficult to imagine,
since they would all come out alike. For my purposes here, all
that I can say is even if more is involved in art criticism than
my two conditions, those two conditions must differ with
respect to the two works and, perforce, their art criticisms will
differ, probably substantially.
It was probably just as well that I did not press on, twentyfive years ago, for a leak-proof definition of art. It was a lot to
have learned from the art of the Sixties that we cannot just
pick the art works out, the way we can pick out giraffes and
rhinoceroses, as the Wittgensteinians supposed we could in
their discussions of the futility of looking for a definition of art.
They would certainly have balked at the idea that the
difference between art works and real things had to be
invisible. Recently, the painter Phillip Pearlstein told me how,
many years ago, there were two students at Skowhegen when
he was teaching there one summer, who simply did no work,
and were told that they had better produce something before
the summer ended to keep their end of the bargain. One night
they dug a hole. In fact, it had sharp corners and clean edges,
as if someone had removed a brick-shaped load of dirt leaving
an empty space the shape of a perfectly transparent oblong.
But any hole would have done. You could not remove it and
send it to an art museum, any more, to use a Shakespearean
example, you could take an even pound of flesh without a drop
of blood. Students and faculty talked about it for what was left
of the summer. The sculptor Tony Smith thought that it
opened up a new era of art. Why was it art — negative
sculpture say — and not just a hole?
Susan Vogel, in 1992 Director of the Museum of African Art,
commissioned me to write the essay Ivan Gaskell cites as "Art
and Artifact in Africa." At issue was the ontological status of a
Zande fishing net she found in the basement of the Museum of
Natural History, brought back by an expedition. It would not
have been considered an art work then, but the art world had
not stood still. Near the end of her life in the late Sixties, Eva
Hesse produced two rope pieces — net-like sculptures soaked
with latex. She hated prettiness in art, in case anyone
observed that the Zande net was prettier than her rope pieces.

Anyone worth talking to in 1969 would have recognized
Hesse's pieces as art, and some might have suggested that
the resemblance between them and the Zande net was close
enough that it could have been enfranchised as art and
moved, so to speak, upstairs. That would have been a
Wittgensteinian kind of mistake. Aesthetic superiority did not
count. It was a (mere) artifact. It had the wrong kind of
meaning, which did not give anyone license to throw it into the
nearest dumptster. Susan exhibited it for purposes of raising
the question of what its status was, in one of her most brilliant
exhibitions.
It would be awkward to insist that art and artifact are
exclusive terms. George Dickie counts "x is an artifact" as a
necessary condition in his definition of art, and I could scarcely
tolerate a ruling that demolishes his definition by default, if
only because most works of art really are artifacts to begin
with. So it would have to be "mere" artifact, like the Zande
net, or, for the matter, Artemus Ward's suitably named "riddle"
(which is not, I find, etymologically connected to the term
Ward's granddaughter uses, "unriddle," on her quilt). The
artifact Ivan shows is so called because it is riddled with holes,
hence a sieve. Both are artifacts that could be art works,
which makes the point that one cannot tell the difference by
how something looks. Whether something that looks like a
riddle is a work of art depends on whether it embodies a
meaning, and that does not meet the eye. It is not a matter of
aesthetics. The quilts of the great quilt-makers of Gee's Bend,
exhibited a few years ago to great acclaim in the Whitney
Museum of American Art, were riddled with meanings, to use
the term metaphorically, as well as extremely beautiful, but
their resemblance to abstract paintings alone would not have
been enough to enfranchise them, even if it would have been
enough to get them into museum precincts. Issues of
ontology, these days, are but loosely connected to issues of
provenance. The artist Jim Hodges makes decorative hangings
of silk flowers. The Korean artist Kim Sooja works with the
traditional fabrics of her culture, and her exhibit for the 2002
Whitney Biennial served as table cloths in the Central Park
Zoo. The great Fabric Workshop in Philadelphia puts the
cutting edge of art into contact with high artisanship. The art
world is way ahead of us. I am gratified by how much of what
has been happening fits the happily weak set of necessary
conditions that The Transfiguration of the Commonplace laid
down twenty five years ago.
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